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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1889, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s plenary power 
to regulate immigration.1 In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), which Congress has continually revised subject to 
the political and economic norms of the period.2 The INA is a highly 
technical statute and its provisions have prompted much litigation. Ac-
cording to one judge, immigration cases make up forty-six percent of the 
Ninth Circuit’s workload.3 Through the INA, “Congress has developed a 
complex scheme governing admission to our nation and status within our 
borders,”4 which has led to the present intricate and changeable nature of 
immigration law.5 
In addition to its complexities, immigration law may result in se-
vere consequences that oftentimes exceed the punishments in criminal 
law. While being present in the United States without permission is not a 
“crime,”6 a removal order often triggers greater hardship than a criminal 
sentence. Families are separated, lives are dismantled, and frequently, the 
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 1. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–06 (1889). 
 2. See Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW 471, 471 (1998). 
 3. In 2007, Judge Carlos T. Bea remarked that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, I think . . . [immigration 
appeals] are up to forty-six percent of our cases.” Judge Carlos T. Bea, Ninth Circuit, Debate at the 
2007 National Lawyers Convention: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law (Nov. 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/immigrati on-amnesty-and-the-rule-of-law-
event-audiovideo. 
 4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). 
 5. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding 
that the determination of a right to remain in the United States required a complex legal analysis 
involving multiple federal statutes, prior court decisions, adjudicatory bodies, appeals, and excep-
tions); Won Kidane, Immigration Law as Contract Law, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 889, 889 (2011) 
(“[I]mmigration law is a conundrum of a sort—very difficult to teach to law students, let alone ex-
plain to the ordinary migrant new to the American legal system.”). 
 6. Conversely, crossing a U.S. border illegally is a misdemeanor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325; Plyer, 
457 U.S. at 205 (“Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime . . . .”). 
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deportee is not permitted to return to the United States.7 The Supreme 
Court has “long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe pen-
alty,”8 and there are a string of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions 
affirming the criminal and punitive nature of deportation.9 
Regardless, deportation is not a criminal punishment, but a “civil 
sanction.”10 The civil nature of immigration proceedings means that var-
ious constitutional protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial 
are absent in a removal hearing.11 This includes the Constitution’s abso-
lute prohibition against ex post facto laws—laws that apply retroactive-
ly.12 The Constitution’s bar on ex post facto laws and the presumption 
against retroactive legislation are rooted in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.13 It reflects a basic notion of fairness that individuals will not be 
punished for relying on prior legislative acts, that they will have an op-
portunity to know what the law is, and that they will have the ability to 
conform their conduct accordingly.14 A presumption against retroactive 
legislation exists in the civil setting as well, but varying exceptions and 
Supreme Court inconsistencies and discrepancies make this area of law 
unpredictable.15 The technical complexities, the conflicting agency and 
                                                 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Deportees remain unable to return to the U.S. either perma-
nently, or in some instances, until a certain amount of time has elapsed, for example, five, ten, or 
twenty years. Id. 
 8. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (find-
ing that “deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants 
who plead guilty to specified crimes”). 
 9. See, e.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1954) (“Although not penal in charac-
ter, deportation statutes as a practical matter may inflict ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’ . . . 
and should be strictly construed.”); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (reading a de-
portation statute narrowly “because deportation is a drastic measure”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 
135, 154 (1945). Additionally, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) significantly expanded 
its criminal enforcement policies in the past decade. See Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The 
Postville Raid and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 653 
(2009). 
 10. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a 
purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry 
. . . .”). 
 11. There are various substantive and procedural safeguards mandated in criminal proceedings 
that are not required for immigration proceedings, including the right to a government-appointed 
lawyer, prohibitions on ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment, the 
guarantee of a jury trial, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612–17 (1960); Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Jan. 
7, 2009) (“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases does not 
apply because removal proceedings are civil.”), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Bd. of Immigration 
Appeals June 3, 2009). 
 12. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
 14. See generally Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). 
 15. See generally Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and 
Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1565 (1998). 
2012] The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity 247 
circuit court decisions, and the punitive nature of deportation make retro-
activity within immigration law even more convoluted. 
A hypothetical may help demonstrate the unique dangers that det-
rimental reliance and conflicting rules of law pose in the immigration 
context: a Mexican couple and their ten-year-old child cross the border 
illegally near the Tijuana San Ysidro port of entry and begin living in 
Los Angeles. Because the boy entered illegally, the INA prohibits the 
child from legalizing his status through most immigrant or non-
immigrant visa processes within the U.S.16 For twelve years the boy 
works illegally, saves money, and avoids detection. Then, Congress 
passes a law allowing certain aliens to apply for a waiver and adjust their 
status without having to return to their country of origin. The statute is 
ambiguous as to whether aliens, who entered illegally, may also apply 
for the waiver to adjust their status. The issue goes to the Ninth Circuit 
and the court rules that the waiver does apply to aliens who entered ille-
gally. After this rule of law is announced, the boy comes out of hiding, 
hires an immigration attorney, pays the application fee of over $1,000, a 
fine of $1,000, and a waiver fee of over $500, and applies to adjust his 
status to that of a Legal Permanent Resident based on the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling. 
Meanwhile, the agency in charge of executing immigration laws, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), reviews the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion and issues a conflicting opinion that the waiver does not apply to 
aliens who entered illegally. Five years after its original decision, the 
Ninth Circuit revisits the issue and, based on principles of agency defer-
ence, gives effect to the BIA’s interpretation. Meanwhile, the agency 
already accepted the boy’s application fees, but never adjudicated the 
                                                 
 16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). To be eligible for adjustment of status, the immigrant must be 
“admitted or paroled,” meaning the boy must have entered the U.S. through a valid point of entry 
and presented himself to a Customs and Border Patrol agent. Id. To gain an immigrant or non-
immigrant visa, the boy must depart from the U.S. and attempt to obtain the requisite visa at a U.S. 
consulate in Mexico. See Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://uscis.gov (last visited Sept. 4 2012) (follow “Green Card” hyperlink; then “Green Card Pro-
cesses and Procedures” hyperlink). But when the boy leaves the United States he becomes automati-
cally inadmissible by virtue of his unlawful presence in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i). To return to the U.S., the boy must not only be eligible for a visa, but now that he 
is inadmissible, he must illustrate that the denial of his visa will result in extreme hardship—
hardship beyond the norm—to his parents or wife, assuming that they have Legal Permanent Resi-
dent (LPR) or United States Citizenship (USC) status. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). If the boy’s spouse 
or parent is not an LPR or USC, then the boy cannot return for ten years. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). 
If his parent or spouse has the requisite status, but cannot illustrate that they would suffer hardship 
beyond what is normally suffered from separation, then the boy cannot return for ten years. See id. 
While the United States Citizen and Immigration Services reviews the application for a visa and 
waiver for unlawful presence, which can last from a few months to a few years, the boy must remain 
in Mexico. 
248 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:245 
application during the five-year period when the controlling interpreta-
tion of the law was in his favor. After the subsequent conflicting Ninth 
Circuit decision, the agency denies the boy’s application and instead 
places him in removal proceedings. 
In the five years that passed between the Ninth Circuit’s two con-
flicting opinions, a great number17 of individuals, like the boy, relied on 
the prior ruling, came out of hiding, spent their life savings on immigra-
tion attorneys and fees, and were then placed into removal proceedings 
after the agency accepted their applications and fees, then denied the ap-
plications based on the Court’s subsequent decision. By applying the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision retroactively, the boy and potentially hundreds 
of similarly situated individuals will be removed to their country of 
origin after acting to their detriment, by paying the thousands of dollars 
in application fees to the government and coming out of the shadows, in 
reliance on a previously announced rule of law. The potential unfairness 
of the retroactive application of law is manifest and contrary to “familiar 
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expecta-
tions.”18 
This hypothetical is based on Gonzales v. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Duran Gonzales), which, at the time of writing this 
Comment, is pending petition for rehearing en banc at the Ninth Cir-
cuit.19 The Ninth Circuit first reheard Duran Gonzales in light of another 
recent Ninth Circuit decision, Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, but the three judge 
panel of Duran Gonzales III ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s action on 
October 25, 2011, applying the previously announced rule of law retroac-
tively.20 Plaintiffs then filed for a petition for rehearing en banc on De-
cember 9, 2011.21 Nunez-Reyes, an en banc decision, addressed the ques-
tion of when the court may apply a new rule of law to past events in the 
immigration context.22 While factually distinct from Duran Gonzales, 
                                                 
 17. The plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales,alleged that there were hundreds of prospective class 
members who filed applied for I-212 waivers in reliance on the rule announced in Perez-Gonzalez v. 
Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). See Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D. 
620 (W.D. Wash. 2006), vacated and remanded, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 18. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (considering whether section 102 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively). 
 19. Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Duran Gonzales II), 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 
2007); see also Duran Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Duran Gonzales III), 659 F.3d 
930, 932 (9th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of the complex procedural history of Duran Gonzales, see 
infra Parts V and VI. 
 20. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 939. 
 21. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174), availa-
ble at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Duran-petition-rehearing-en-banc-
final.pdf. 
 22. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 691–94 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Nunez-Reyes applied a new rule of law to aliens prospectively only and, 
importantly, required the use of a test laid out in the Supreme Court’s 
decision Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.23 The Chevron Oil test weighs reli-
ance interests when deciding whether or not to apply an agency decision 
retroactively.24 The Ninth Circuit’s decision to use the Chevron Oil test 
to assess retroactivity is significant because, for the first time, circuit 
courts are recognizing that immigration cases do not fit squarely within 
the traditional civil context. Due to the very high stakes involved in im-
migration proceedings, upsetting reasonable, settled expectations based 
on the law in place at the time may result in severe consequences that 
transcend criminal punishment.25 
Using Duran Gonzales as an example, this Comment discusses how 
courts determine when and if conflicting rules of law should be applied 
retroactively to aliens. Specifically, it argues that the holding in Nunez-
Reyes and its use of the Chevron Oil test should be applied broadly to 
limit the retroactive application of law in certain immigration cases. Part 
II of this Comment gives a brief overview of Supreme Court retroactivity 
jurisprudence, the discretionary application of adjudicative retroactivity 
as described in Chevron Oil, and the Court’s recent shift toward a more 
conservative approach. Part III discusses how administrative law affects 
that framework and how courts apply it after the Supreme Court, in 
Chevron USA26 and Brand X,27 adopted a policy of extreme agency def-
erence.28 Part IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s Nunez-Reyes decision. 
Part V traces the complex procedural and factual history of Duran Gon-
zales as well as the Ninth Circuit and BIA cases surrounding it. Part VI 
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision of Duran Gonzales III and 
explains why it failed to apply Nunez-Reyes appropriately. Finally, Part 
VII offers a brief conclusion. 
                                                 
 23. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
 24. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 690. 
 25. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating 
that deportation is a “penalty,” “a drastic measure,” “and at times the equivalent of banishment or 
exile”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (noting that deportation may result in “loss 
. . . of all that makes life worth living”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) 
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and busi-
ness and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and oftentimes most 
severe and cruel.”). 
 26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 27. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 28. A full analysis of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and the interplay of 
agency law is beyond the scope of this Comment. For example, this Comment does not focus on the 
difference between primary and secondary retroactivity, the distinction between selective and pure 
retroactivity, or the specific constitutional limitations on retroactivity, nor does it examine in detail 
when courts do and do not defer to agency interpretation. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL RETROACTIVITY 
Retroactivity has a tortured history in the Supreme Court. Tradi-
tionally, the Court has distinguished between retroactive legislation by 
Congress and retroactive adjudication by the judiciary.29 An assumption 
exists that statutes operate prospectively, while court decisions may ap-
ply retroactively to the parties under direct review.30 Put simply, while 
Congress cannot create new laws that presently penalize prior conduct, 
judges may, through adjudication, issue decisions that affect previous 
behavior. While the origin of the doctrine traces back to the writing of 
the Constitution,31 it was not formulated until a series of criminal law 
decisions in the 1960s.32 Due to similar concerns of finality, fairness, 
reliance, and stare decisis, retroactivity presents a similar problem in 
both criminal and civil contexts.33 
The first court to part with the traditional rule of retroactive applica-
tion was Linkletter v. Walker, a criminal case decided in 1965, which 
held that a subsequent adjudication is subject to no set “principle of abso-
lute retroactive invalidity” but instead that there are cases where the in-
terests of justice make the rule prospective.34 Thus, a determination of 
retroactivity depends on “weighing the merits and demerits in each 
case.”35 
Since Linkletter, the traditional rules for both civil retroactive legis-
lation and adjudication began to erode. The Supreme Court formulated 
new tests that involved increased levels of judicial discretion in both are-
as. In the legislative context, the Court remained faithful to the principle 
that retroactive legislation is unjust, subject to few exceptions.36 Con-
versely, adjudicative retroactivity has grown more complex and contra-
                                                 
 29. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 30. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311−12 (1994) (“The principle that 
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to 
every law student . . . .”). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
 32. For an overview of the Warren Court decisions, see Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the 
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 33. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) (“[W]hile the constitutional imped-
iments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default 
rule.”). 
 34. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965). For a more complete explanation of 
Linkletter and its progeny, see Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for 
Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 601−04 (2009). 
 35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627. 
 36. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 n.15 (1974) ( “[T]he effect 
of a subsequent ruling of invalidity on a prior final judgment under collateral attack is subject to no 
fixed ‘principle of absolute retroactive invalidity’ but depends upon consideration of ‘particular 
relations . . . and particular conduct.’”); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282–83 
(1969). 
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dictory in the past forty years. Like Linkletter, the Supreme Court’s ear-
lier cases were rooted in principles of fairness; however, the current state 
of the doctrine has been described as “inconsistent,”37 frustrating,38 and 
“somewhat chaotic.”39 
A. Adjudicative Retroactivity, Chevron Oil v. Huson, and Its Progeny 
Generally, adjudicative rules are announced in the case under direct 
review. Because pre-existing facts are involved, and because the newly 
announced judicial decision applies to those facts, the new rule of law 
may apply retroactively to the parties under review.40 The Supreme Court 
changed this general rule and developed a discretionary approach to civ-
il-adjudicative retroactivity when it decided Chevron Oil v. Huson in 
1971.41 
Chevron Oil involved an action brought by the family of a work-
man injured on an oil drilling rig off the coast of Louisiana.42 Three years 
after his injury, and during the discovery phase of the lawsuit, the rele-
vant choice-of-law rule was overruled by Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. through its interpretation of the Lands Act.43 The effect of 
Rodrigue was substantial: it shortened the statute of limitations for per-
sonal injury cases to one year, and, if applied retroactively to the plaintiff 
in Chevron Oil, would have time-barred his claim.44 
After discussing prior civil cases, which refused to apply new rules 
retroactively, the Chevron Oil Court established a three-factor test to de-
termine when a court’s newly announced rule should only apply prospec-
tively.45 First, the judicial decision must announce a new principle of 
                                                 
 37. Stephens, supra note 15, at 1565. 
 38. William Reed Huguet, Note, Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp.-In Pursuit of A Workable Frame-
work for Adjudicative Retroactivity Analysis in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2000) (“[T]he 
temporal effects of judicial decisions continues to frustrate jurists and United States Supreme Court 
Justices alike.”). 
 39. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice O’Connor described the history of the doctrine:  
Three Terms ago, the case of American Trucking . . . produced three opinions, none of 
which garnered a majority. One Term later, James B. Beam . . . yielded five opinions; 
there, no single writing carried more than three votes. As a result, the Court today finds 
itself confronted with such disarray that, rather than relying on precedent, it must resort to 
vote counting: examining the various opinions in Jim Beam, it discerns six votes for a 
single proposition that, in its view, controls this case. 
Id. 
 40. Harper, 509 U.S. at 86–87. 
 41. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–09 (1971). 
 42. Id. at 98-99. 
 43. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). 
 44. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98−99. 
 45. Id. at 106−07. 
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law.46 A new rule is only a “new principle of law” if it overrules past 
precedent on which the parties relied, or alternatively, interprets an issue 
of first impression, the resolution of which is not obvious.47 Second, the 
court “‘weigh[s] the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the 
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether 
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’”48 This factor 
looks at the overall policy of the rule and examines whether retroactive 
enforcement furthers that policy. Finally, the court considers whether the 
decision “could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroac-
tively.”49 This involves assessing the inequity that is imposed by retroac-
tive application, usually due to good faith reliance on a previous rule of 
law.50 For example, because immigration law often concludes in a re-
moval order, the resulting inequity may be substantially higher than it 
would otherwise be in a traditional civil setting. Essentially, the three-
factor test resembles a traditional balancing-of-equities approach.51 
In Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court found that the three factors 
weighed in favor of applying the new rule only prospectively.52 Rodrigue 
was a case of first impression, and because it was decided three years 
after the plaintiff’s injury, the Court found that he had relied on the prior 
rule, that he could not foresee that it would be overturned, and that ap-
plying the new law retroactively would be unfair.53 Additionally, because 
the goal of the Lands Act was to provide “comprehensive and familiar 
remedies” to individuals like the plaintiff, retroactive application of the 
ruling in this case would defeat this purpose by denying the plaintiff a 
remedy.54 
The Supreme Court strictly adhered to the Chevron Oil test for fif-
teen years but continues to debate its vitality, making the area of adjudi-
cative retroactivity far from settled.55 The subsequent string of opinions 
are confusing and conflicting, and they create a series of complex is-
sues.56 While it appears that subsequent Supreme Court decisions eroded 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 106. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). 
 49. Id. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969)). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Ad-
ministrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 354 (2003). In this article, Levin provides an overview of a 
balancing of the equities approach. 
 52. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107. 
 53. Id. at 107–08. 
 54. Id. at 108. 
 55. See generally Stephens, supra note 15. 
 56. A thorough evaluation of Supreme Court jurisprudence on civil adjudicative retroactivity is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full explanation of each case and the varying opinions, 
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the importance of the Chevron Oil test,57 it was never expressly over-
ruled.58 Instead, the policy concerns of fairness and reliance, which were 
paramount in Chevron Oil, have been replaced by a more “classical” 
view that focuses on two primary concerns with prospectivity: (1) that a 
prospective application of an adjudicatory rule will result in inequity 
among parties; and (2) that prospectivity is a form of “judicial activ-
ism.”59 
Post-Chevron Oil decisions favored the retroactive application of 
law because it was central to the equal treatment of individuals.60 Shift-
ing toward a classical approach, the Court reasoned that fundamental 
notions of fairness dictate that similarly situated parties be treated simi-
larly.61 A retroactive application of the decision allows for equality be-
cause the new rule applies to all cases and prevents the Court from con-
ferring the new rule in a single case.62 The Court was concerned that if 
new rules were applied prospectively to only those who first brought the 
issue to a court, those parties would be the only ones to take advantage 
of the new rule.63 Importantly, this view is concerned with rules that 
might be advantageous, rather than rules that might be punitive. 
Also inherent in the classical view are unflinching principles con-
cerning the separation of powers—the Court considered its larger role as 
a rule interpreter rather than a rule maker.64 Specifically, Article III of 
the Constitution only permits federal courts to hear “cases” or “contro-
versies.”65 Because the judiciary does not have the power to “create” law, 
a new rule resolving a specific controversy must be applied to all similar 
cases pending on direct review. Therefore, as Justice Scalia noted in 
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, “prospective decisionmaking is in-
compatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to 
prescribe what it shall be.”66 
                                                                                                             
doctrines, and principles, see Stephens, supra note 15. See also Meir Katz, Comment, Plainly Not 
“Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979 (2004). 
 57. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1993). 
 58. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–94 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 59. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling 
Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916 (1990); Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 60. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 530. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 540–44 (holding that according to principles of equality and stare decisis, it is 
error for a court to refuse to retroactively apply a law when it was applied to the case announcing the 
law). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 544. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 66. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In truth, the Court’s asser-
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Justice Scalia’s approach equates prospectivity with “judicial activ-
ism” because the law has always been the law, and courts merely state 
what it is.67 Prospectivity would create two rules of law where Congress 
created one, and judges do not have the power to “create” law in this 
manner.68 To avoid judicial activism, this view engages in a “legal fic-
tion” by pretending that the prior judicial interpretation of the law never 
existed. Even though there are successive conflicting interpretations of a 
statute, the law can only have one true meaning and, therefore, has al-
ways “meant” the same thing. The subsequent rule applies retroactively 
because that is what the law has always been, even when the subsequent 
rule is diametrically opposed to the previous one. This classical approach 
denies judges’ status as lawmakers and elevates retroactivity to a consti-
tutional mandate.69 
This reasoning was espoused in both James B. Beam Distilling Co. 
v. Georgia and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, yet both cas-
es resulted in multiple opinions and no clear standard. Beam produced 
five separate opinions in which, according to Justice Souter, “principles 
of equity and stare decisis . . . prevail[] over any claim based on Chevron 
Oil analysis.”70 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and wrote sepa-
rately to expressly disapprove of the judicial activism inherent in pro-
spective-only application.71 The majority of the opinions did not apply 
the Chevron Oil test. Conversely, the dissenters applied Chevron Oil, 
argued for prospectivity, and based their opinions on the “potentially 
devastating liability without fair warning” for the “blameless” defend-
ants.72 
Harper involved retired federal employees attempting to take ad-
vantage of a previously announced Supreme Court decision—they 
sought refunds for state income taxes and argued that a prior rule should 
                                                                                                             
tion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases . . . that have not already run the full 
course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that [its] constitutional function is not one of 
adjudication but in effect of legislation.”). 
 67. See Am. Trucking, 496 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that judges have the power “‘to say what the law is,’ not the power to 
change it” (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))). 
 68. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Unlike a legislature, we do not 
promulgate new rules to ‘be applied prospectively only’ . . . .”); see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The true traditional view is that pro-
spective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no au-
thority to engage in the practice.”). 
 69. See generally Harper, 509 U.S. 86. 
 70. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540. 
 71. See id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 558 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent. 
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apply retroactively to them.73 The rule at issue in Harper was benevolent 
rather than penal. Relying on Beam, Harper adopted a rule that a new 
judicial rule of law will generally be applied retroactively to all cases 
pending on direct review, even if events predate or postdate the court’s 
announcement of the rule.74 Because the lower court did not apply the 
holding to the parties in that case, the Supreme Court reversed.75 Thus, in 
cases where the rule has already been retroactively applied to the parties 
on direct review, that application trumps Chevron Oil.76 The Court did 
not, however, overrule Chevron Oil, nor did it provide further guidance 
as to when it should be applied. 
Beam, Harper, and other post-Chevron Oil cases disregarded reli-
ance interests and created a presumption of retroactivity. They ignored 
the “individual hardships”77 that occur when adjudicative authorities is-
sue contradicting opinions. Specifically, they disregarded “whether [in-
dividuals] actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from 
retroactive application of the new.”78 Equality and principles of separa-
tion of powers replaced reliance as the foremost protected value, and re-
liance was relegated to remedy law.79 
Even with the Supreme Court’s shift in policy, its opinions re-
mained fractured: Chevron Oil was never expressly overruled, there is no 
clear doctrinal stance on the issue of adjudicative retroactivity, and cir-
cuit splits are common.80 Specifically, the Court has never specified 
when lower courts may use the Chevron Oil test. Therefore, this Com-
ment argues that because the consequences in immigration law are more 
severe than other areas of civil law, courts should apply the Chevron Oil 
test in evaluating retroactivity concerns in immigration cases, just as the 
Ninth Circuit did in Nunez-Reyes.81 
B. A Working Framework in Legislative Retroactivity: Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products 
In the immigration context, the circuit courts and the BIA are usual-
ly the authorities that announce new rules. Certainly, Congress has 
amended and promulgated new portions of the INA, but the majority of 
                                                 
 73. Harper 509 U.S. at 89−92. 
 74. Id. at 97. 
 75. Id. at 97−100. 
 76. Id. at 98. 
 77. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987). 
 78. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991). 
 79. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 198 (1990). 
 80. See generally David N. Mark, Retroactivity of Statute of Limitations Ruling Under the 
Influence of Jim Beam, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 361 (1993) (discussing Chevron Oil’s continuing vitality). 
 81. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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the new rules come from administrative and judicial interpretation, rather 
than agency rulemaking or congressional enactment.82 Accordingly, this 
Comment is largely dedicated to discussing adjudicative retroactivity. 
Yet, because the post-Chevron Oil cases are difficult to apply, analyzing 
retroactive legislation provides a helpful working framework. 
For retroactive legislation, the Supreme Court formulated a clear 
framework in a 1994 case, Landgraf v. USI Film Products.83 The 
Landgraf Court held that when Congress enacts new legislation, absent 
an express prescription of the statute’s reach, courts must determine ret-
roactivity by inquiring “whether it would impair rights a party possessed 
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose 
new duties with respect to transactions already completed.”84 The Court 
retreated toward its traditional presumption that the statute should not 
apply retroactively unless there is a “clear congressional intent favoring 
such a result.”85 
The Landgraf opinion embodied concerns about notice and fairness 
similar to those that animated the Court’s analysis of adjudicative retro-
activity in Chevron Oil. The framework weighed fairness concerns along 
with legislative objectives and renewed the Court’s hostility toward ret-
roactive legislation.86 While not a bright-line rule, Landgraf provides a 
workable framework for lower courts to address retroactive legislation. 
Conversely, there is no Supreme Court precedent equivalent to Landgraf 
to guide lower courts in addressing adjudicative retroactivity.87 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Montgomery Ward Test 
Due to the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the area of civil ret-
roactive adjudication, the Ninth Circuit adopted its own test in Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. FTC in 1982.88 The court adopted a new test that 
clarified whether a new agency rule should apply retroactively.89 Under 
the Montgomery Ward test, if the agency adopts a new rule, the court 
must consider five factors to determine whether the new rule applies ret-
roactively: 
                                                 
 82. For a list of laws amending the INA, see Public Laws Amending the INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVS., http://uscis.gov (last updated June 2012) (follow “Laws” hyperlink; then “Public 
Laws Amending the INA” hyperlink). 
 83. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 84. Id. at 280. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 265–73. 
 87. This is primarily the case because of the concerns emphasized in the “classical” approach, 
as articulated by Justice Scalia. See supra Part II.A. 
 88. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 89. Id. at 1333. 
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(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, 
(2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure 
from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a 
void in an unsettle area of law, (3) the extent to which the 
party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the 
former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroac-
tive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest 
in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the 
old standard.90 
The factors recognize that the agency has an interest in applying its 
decision retroactively; however, those interests are balanced with the 
potentially unfair application to the individual.91 Unique to the Mont-
gomery Ward test, in the civil adjudicatory context, is a presumption 
against retroactivity and its emphasis on detrimental reliance in deciding 
whether to apply a new rule retroactively.92 In the immigration context, 
the Ninth Circuit used the Montgomery Ward test several times to pro-
hibit the retroactive application of a newly announced BIA rule.93 
Montgomery Ward was the Ninth Circuit’s response to unclear Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. Both Landgraf and Montgomery Ward 
demonstrate that it is necessary to consider reliance interests because the 
potential for unfairness is significant. That danger is even greater in im-
migration cases because of the combination of judicial deference to 
agencies and the penal nature of these cases. Agency deference increases 
the danger of inequitable retroactive application in two ways. First, it 
limits judicial review of agency adjudication. Second, it creates conflict-
ing rules of law between the circuit courts and the agency. The potential 
dangers of agency deference are discussed in Part III, which explores the 
administrative law decisions affecting retroactivity in the immigration 
context. 
III. INCREASING AGENCY DEFERENCE: CHEVRON USA AND BRAND X 
“The dynamics of the three branches of Government are well un-
derstood as a general matter. But the role and position of the agen-
cy, and the exact locus of its powers, present questions that are del-
icate, subtle, and complex.”94 
                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 92. Great W. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 916 F.2d 1421, 1431 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 93. See Miguel-Miguel, 500 F.3d at 950−51; Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911, 917−18 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 94. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Unlike traditional civil and criminal cases, an administrative agency 
adjudicates cases based on its own interpretation of the controlling stat-
ute. The Supreme Court confronts those statutory issues with the agen-
cy’s interpretation in mind. Because of the agency’s expertise in the par-
ticular area of law95 and Congress’s decision to provide agencies with the 
power to execute the law, courts must acknowledge agencies’ authority 
to interpret the statutory scheme at issue.96 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron USA) the Supreme 
Court mandated this congressional deference.97 
Chevron USA requires courts to defer to agency interpretation when 
the underlying statute is ambiguous. Agency deference, or “Chevron def-
erence,” replaces the de novo judicial review of the agency’s legal con-
clusions.98 Applying Chevron deference to an ambiguous statute is a two-
step test.99 First, the court determines whether the statute’s plain terms 
“directly . . . [address] the precise question at issue.”100 If the intent of 
Congress is clear, then the court and the agency must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress because an unambiguous 
statute “contains no gap for the agency to fill.”101 If the court determines 
“Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,” the 
court defers to the agency’s interpretation and asks whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.102 If the stat-
ute is unclear and the agency’s construction is reasonable, then the court 
accepts that construction of the statute.103 This deference reflects the 
agency’s expertise and Congress’s allocation of power to the agency to 
properly execute the law.104 While there are exceptions to Chevron def-
erence,105 it is a dominating principle in administrative law. 
                                                 
 95. See Ryan M. Carson, Note, Chinks in the Armor: Municipal Authority to Enact Shoreline 
Permit Moratoria After Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 210−11 
(2007) (“Agencies are given deference because it is presumed that some measure of added compe-
tence or expertise is present within the agency, more so than the general legislative body.”). 
 96. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841–42 (1984). 
“The adoption of the ‘Chevron doctrine,’ as it is commonly known, has spawned a vast range of 
issues for litigation and scholarly commentary.” Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: 
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 572 (2007).. 
 97. Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 841–43. 
 98. Id. at 842–44. 
 99. Id. at 842. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005). 
 102. Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See generally United States v Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Chevron deference is 
especially warranted if the agency’s interpretation involves highly technical policy considerations 
that the federal courts have no experience in. Id. As a result, when litigants challenge “the wisdom of 
[an] agency’s policy,” rather than its reasonableness under the relevant statute, the challenge must 
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The Supreme Court went even further in National Cable & Tele-
communications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, requiring Chevron 
deference to agencies’ legal conclusions whenever a circuit court deci-
sion conflicted with an agency’s conclusions and those conclusions were 
based on an ambiguous statute.106 In Brand X, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of a 
federal statute even though it conflicted with existing Ninth Circuit prec-
edent.107 Circuit court precedent only controls if it stems from an unam-
biguous statute,108 but courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute that carries the “force of law.”109 Im-
portantly, the order in which courts and agencies construct a statute does 
not limit the deferential weight accorded to the agency.110 Thus, when an 
agency issues a subsequent opinion and it conflicts with prior circuit 
court precedent, the circuit court must overrule its precedent and defer to 
the agency’s interpretation. This is because Brand X extends Chevron 
deference—even when courts interpret an ambiguous statute before the 
agency does.111 
The BIA, within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, is 
the principal federal administrative agency to which Congress delegated 
the authority to adjudicate the INA through the Attorney General and the 
Department of Justice.112 Chevron deference applies to the BIA as it in-
terprets the INA—the BIA provides meaning to those provisions of the 
INA that are ambiguous.113 Through BIA’s case-by-case adjudication, it 
                                                                                                             
fail: “federal judges–who have no constituency–have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices 
made by those who do.” Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 866. 
 105. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (holding that when agency 
actions lack the force of law—such as opinion letters and policy statements—the Circuit Court may 
interpret the law de novo because the agency has not been delegated authority to administer it). 
 106. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005). 
 107. Id. at 968–69. 
 108. Id. at 982. 
 109. Id. at 982–83. Although the Court did not define “force of law,” the Ninth Circuit subse-
quently concluded that “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and en-
forcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” 
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (deciding whether statutory rape 
under § 261.5 of the California Penal Code is sexual abuse of a minor for immigration purposes, but 
not applying the Chevron doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation because the BIA’s ruling did not carry 
the force of law). 
 110. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). 
 113. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 
F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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bridges the INA’s statutory gaps,114 and published decisions by the BIA 
meet the “force of law” requirement.115 If a statute is ambiguous, and if 
the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron USA re-
quires federal courts to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, 
even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the 
best statutory interpretation.116 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit must, gener-
ally, defer to the BIA’s construction of the INA, even if it believes that 
construction to be erroneous. 
Judicial deference to the BIA, however, is not always appropriate. 
A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute will trump the agency’s 
construction if the court decision follows from the unambiguous terms of 
the statute.117 If the statute is unambiguous there is no room left for agen-
cy discretion.118 Chevron USA established a “presumption that Congress, 
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agen-
cy, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, 
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess 
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”119 Even though the 
court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is not authoritative, a dif-
ferent agency construction does not indicate that the court’s holding was 
necessarily legally incorrect.120 
It is within the agency’s power to choose a different construction of 
the statute because it is the authoritative interpreter of such statutes— 
within the limits of reason.121 In all other respects, the court’s prior ruling 
remains binding law.122 The precedent has not been “reversed” by the 
agency any more than a federal court’s interpretation of a state’s law can 
be said to have been “reversed” by a state court that adopts a conflict-
ing—yet authoritative—interpretation of state law. In practice, however, 
circuit courts will usually reverse a prior position once a subsequent and 
                                                 
 114. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 416; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (“[I]t is for agen-
cies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”). 
 115. See Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1081. 
 116. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
 117. Id. at 865–66. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740−41 (1996). 
 120. See Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. For example, the court’s rulings would trump agency interpretations to which Chevron 
deference does not apply. Id. 
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conflicting agency interpretation has been issued, and the particular issue 
reaches the circuit court in a later case.123 
In sum, under the Supreme Court’s Chevron USA and Brand X de-
cisions, the BIA need only issue an opinion that carries the force of 
law—making it eligible for Chevron deference—to set aside the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation. Then, under Brand X, circuit courts are forced to 
overrule precedent unless they can show that the statute was unambigu-
ous, the ruling did not carry the force of law, or the BIA’s interpretation 
was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.124 
This extreme deference to the BIA, coupled with the Supreme 
Court’s post-Chevron Oil retroactivity jurisprudence discussed in Part II, 
can result in fundamental unfairness when an alien acts in reliance on 
prior circuit court precedent that is later supplanted by a new administra-
tive rule, placing the alien in a detrimental position. Aliens rely on valid 
circuit court precedent, the court defers to the BIA and changes its rule, 
and the court then applies that rule retroactively to those aliens. In 2011, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized the inequity that reliance and retroactivity 
can have in the immigration arena when it refused to apply a new admin-
istrative rule retroactively in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder.125 Part IV of this 
Comment traces the Nunez-Reyes decision and its use of Chevron Oil to 
alleviate the unfairness of retroactivity in the immigration context. 
IV. RELIANCE INTERESTS AND CHEVRON OIL REVIVED: NUNEZ-REYES V. 
HOLDER 
In deciding Nunez-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior deci-
sion in Lujan-Armendariz v. INS.126 Lujan-Armendariz—on the basis of 
equal protection theory and the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA)—
provided that a vacated, expunged, or otherwise set-aside state convic-
tion for first time, simple possessory offenses of controlled substances 
nullified the effects of the conviction on one’s immigration status.127 It 
created an exception to the general rule, applicable only in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, that convictions expunged pursuant to state rehabilitative statutes 
                                                 
 123. See, e.g., Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA’s 
decision In Re Honorio Torres-Garcia precluded the Ninth Circuit’s previous and conflicting con-
struction of an amendment to the INA). 
 124. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Derived from the Administrative Procedure Act, the “arbitrary and 
capricious standard” is interpreted very narrowly. 
 125. 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 126. Id. at 688; Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 127. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 736. For example, a crime of shoplifting, a crime of moral 
turpitude making it a deportable offense under the INA, could be waived under the FFOA and the 
rule announced in Lujan-Armendariz. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
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would not be given effect.128 Of every circuit court, the Ninth Circuit was 
the only one to adopt this interpretation and apply the FFOA to state 
convictions.129 Thus, it was only a matter of time before Lujan-
Armendariz would be overturned—the only question was to what extent. 
Nunez-Reyes answered that question by overturning Lujan-Armendariz 
and holding that the FFOA could no longer be applied to state criminal 
convictions.130 But the court found retroactivity concerns with the appli-
cation of this new rule and specifically limited its decision to apply only 
prospectively to aliens convicted after the publication of Nunez-Reyes.131 
In finding that the new rule should not be imposed retroactively on 
people who had been convicted prior to the new rule being announced, 
Nunez-Reyes applied Chevron Oil’s three-factor test.132 The Nunez-Reyes 
court, sitting en banc, recognized the complexities of the Supreme 
Court’s retroactive adjudicatory jurisprudence and acknowledged that 
decisions like Harper and Beam cast doubt on whether the Chevron Oil 
test is still good law.133 Nunez-Reyes held that while the “default princi-
ple” is to apply the court’s decision retroactively, the court found itself 
“bound by Chevron Oil” because “all three of [its] requirements . . . are 
met.”134 The court laid out the requirements: (1) a civil case, (2) an an-
nouncement of a “new rule of law,” and (3) the new rule’s lack of a rela-
tionship to the court’s jurisdiction.135 The new rule must apply to all sim-
ilarly situated parties, meaning that the court cannot pick and choose to 
whom the decision applies prospectively and to whom it applies retroac-
tively.136 If the court does not have the jurisdiction to apply the new law 
prospectively, it cannot do so. 137 Because Nunez-Reyes involved a civil 
case, where the court announced a new rule of law that did not concern 
its jurisdiction, the court applied the Chevron Oil test.138 
Finding that Chevron Oil applied, the Nunez-Reyes court then pro-
ceeded through the three-step Chevron Oil test to decide if the newly 
announced rule should apply retroactively. The first step in the Chevron 
                                                 
 128. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 737. 
 129. See, e.g., Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003); Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS, 
281 F.3d 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 130. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 688. 
 131. Id. at 690. 
 132. Id. at 691 (“We apply the three-pronged test outlined in Chevron Oil . . . .”). 
 133. See id. The Nunez-Reyes court noted that, in Harper, “the Supreme Court cast serious 
doubt upon the continuing vitality of the Chevron Oil test.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 134. Id. at 692. 
 135. Id. at 691. 
 136. Id. at 690. 
 137. Id. at 691. 
 138. Id. at 692 (“In this civil case, we announce a new rule of law that does not concern our 
jurisdiction. The Chevron Oil test applies.”). 
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Oil test requires that the court announce “a new principle of law.” 139 For 
example, under the prior rule in Lujan-Armendariz, aliens pleaded guilty 
to certain crimes knowing that their convictions could be expunged and 
not affect their immigration status.140 Nunez-Reyes established a new rule 
by overruling Lujan-Armendariz, a precedent upon “which previous liti-
gants may have relied.”141 Moreover, in determining whether a court an-
nounced a “new principle of law,” the Nunez-Reyes court considered the 
clarity of the prior rule and stressed the importance of reliance inter-
ests.142 Specifically, the court considered whether aliens would suffer a 
penalty if they could not rely on the old rule and whether they could 
“make a fully informed decision” based on the conflicting rules of law.143 
Because of the consistent application and reliance on the rule in Lujan-
Armendariz, the court found that Nunez-Reyes declared a new principle 
of law.144 Importantly, the first step of the Chevron Oil test, as analyzed 
by the Nunez-Reyes court, considers retroactivity apart from agency def-
erence. The court did not use Chevron USA or Brand X to defer to the 
BIA, but instead focused on reliance interests to determine that a new 
rule of law had been announced.145 
The court proceeded to the second step of the Chevron Oil test by 
considering the “effect and purpose” of the new principle of law and ana-
lyzing whether “retroactive operation will further or retard that rule’s 
operation.”146 The court acknowledged that while Congress intended 
state-law convictions to have adverse immigration consequences, Con-
gress also intended that aliens receive the constitutional protections of 
the justice system.147 Under Lujan-Armendariz, aliens could plead to cer-
tain categories of offenses before having a jury trial, resulting in the un-
informed waiver of their constitutional rights.148 And while the waiver of 
one’s constitutional rights was important, the court also held that the ret-
roactive application of the Nunez-Reyes rule would not further immigra-
tion laws because “[c]ontrary to their understanding that there would 
be no immigration consequences, the actual consequence is the severe 
penalty of removal.”149 Thus, because aliens relied on the prior rule, and 
                                                 
 139. Id. 
 140. Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 732-34 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 141. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 692 (citations omitted). 
 142. Id. at 693−94. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 694. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 699. 
 147. Id. at 699–700. 
 148. See generally Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 149. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 694. 
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would be severely penalized because of that good-faith reliance, the re-
sulting inequity is sufficient to retard the rule’s ultimate operation.150 
The third step asks whether the application of the new rule “could 
produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively.”151 The 
court found the facts of Nunez-Reyes “easily” satisfied this step because 
of the fundamental unfairness in promising aliens no legal consequences 
and then “[holding] retroactively that their convictions actually carried 
with them the particularly severe penalty of removal.”152 The court also 
cited an Eleventh Circuit case, in which the court determined that “[i]t 
would be inequitable to punish those parties for following the clearly 
established precedent of this Circuit.”153 Because of the reliance on a 
clear precedent, and the severe resulting penalty, the court found that the 
respondents satisfied the third step of the Chevron Oil test.154 
In analyzing each step of Chevron Oil test, the court focused on the 
reliance interests that a retroactive application would affect—interests 
that have lain dormant since Chevron Oil. Nunez-Reyes’s emphasis on 
reliance issues exemplifies the unique nature of immigration law and 
highlights its punitive aspects, which create a greater potential for un-
fairness. When retroactivity is an issue in an immigration case, it is insuf-
ficient to treat it like any other civil or administrative case. The Ninth 
Circuit’s application of Chevron Oil is a reaction to the inequity of ap-
plying agency deference and retroactivity to aliens that are penalized for 
relying on clear precedent. The decision in Nunez-Reyes is a unique doc-
trinal position that should be broadened and expanded in the immigration 
context. Unfortunately, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit recent-
ly narrowed the Nunez-Reyes holding in Duran Gonzales v. U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (Duran Gonzales III).155 Part V of this 
Comment will trace the complex procedural history and analysis of Du-
ran Gonzales II and III. 
V. DURAN GONZALES V. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY I AND II  
This section explains the series of Duran Gonzales cases, the facts 
of which are used to set up the hypothetical at the beginning of this 
Comment. It will trace the Ninth Circuit’s reaction after the BIA promul-
gated a conflicting interpretation of an ambiguous immigration statute 
                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 694 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971)). 
 152. Id. (citations omitted). 
 153. Id. (quoting Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 545 (11th Cir. 
2002)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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and the affect of the retroactive application of that subsequent interpreta-
tion on aliens who relied on the prior Ninth Circuit rule. 
The statute at issue is the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) 
Act, which was enacted on December 21, 2000, and altered the INA to 
allow for certain previously ineligible aliens to remain in the country 
while seeking to adjust their own status.156 Section 245(i) of the LIFE 
Act was ambiguous as to whether previously deported aliens who subse-
quently re-entered without inspection could apply for a discretionary 
waiver—an “I-212 waiver”—along with their adjustment of status appli-
cation.157 This ambiguity was of vast importance to a number of aliens, 
present in the U.S. illegally, who could not apply for an adjustment of 
status (to a Legal Permanent Resident) because they had previously en-
tered without inspection, entered on visas that prohibited adjustment of 
status, or overstayed their visas and thus were generally ineligible for 
adjustment of status.158 Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) renders immigrants who 
re-enter the U.S. without inspection inadmissible, but permits them to 
apply for a waiver once they have remained outside the U.S. for ten 
years.159 Thus, for many immigrants, the LIFE Act was an opportunity to 
waive their prior re-entry, adjust their status, and remain in the country 
legally. Yet, the ambiguity of the LIFE Act opened the door for judicial 
and administrative interpretation. 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the task of resolving the 
LIFE Act’s ambiguity in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft.160 The court held 
that the LIFE Act did, in fact, waive an alien’s illegal re-entry bar and 
allow aliens to adjust their status under § 245(i) if the alien applied for, 
and was granted permission to reapply for, admission after deportation 
via the discretionary I-212 waiver.161 Significantly, the court expressly 
rejected the argument that § 245(i) did not apply to aliens who had re-
entered without inspection and admission after having been deported.162 
Approximately two years later, the BIA issued a conflicting deci-
sion. It decided Matter of Torres-Garcia, and disagreed with the conclu-
sion in Perez-Gonzalez by holding that inadmissibility based on § 
                                                 
 156. See U.S.C. § 1255(i). 
 157. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e). The law states that “an applicant for adjustment of status under 
section 245 of the Act and part 245 of this chapter must request permission to reapply for entry in 
conjunction with his or her application for adjustment of status . . . by filing an application” for 
permission to reapply for an I-212 waiver.” Id. 
 158. See Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D. 620 (W.D. Wash. 2006), va-
cated and remanded, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 159. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(C)(i). 
 160. Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 161. Id. at 788–92. 
 162. Id. at 790 (“[Section] 245(i) clearly contemplates that some aliens who have entered the 
country without legal admission can receive adjustment of status.”). 
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212(a)(9)(C)(i) (re-entry without admission) cannot be cured with a I-
212 waiver.163 Thus, Torres-Garcia prohibited the filing of I-212 waiver 
forms with applications for adjustment of status after removal of the al-
ien and the alien’s re-entrance without being inspected and admitted. 
Before the Perez-Gonzalez decision in 2004, the named plaintiffs in 
Duran Gonzales had been living illegally without detection.164 While 
they had previously been deported, each re-entered the United States 
without inspection and remained unlawfully.165 Because of the plaintiffs’ 
deportation and illegal reentry, they were unable to adjust their statuses 
to that of legal permanent residents based on their inadmissibility under § 
212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the INA.166 After the Ninth Circuit’s Perez-Gonzalez 
decision, the plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales came out of hiding, paid thou-
sands of dollars to immigration attorneys, and in addition, each applicant 
paid the government approximately $3,000.167 The plaintiffs submitted 
all the proper forms and fees to the United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services (USCIS) for adjudication, and the USCIS accepted the 
fees and applications.168 
Adjudication of adjustment of status applications can take years to 
process. While the plaintiffs’ applications were pending, they appealed 
the BIA’s interpretation in Torres-Garcia, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s 
Perez-Gonzalez decision. The matter did not reach the Ninth Circuit until 
2007, when the Ninth Circuit, in Duran Gonzales II, rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that the ambiguous statute should be construed in their 
                                                 
 163. Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (BIA Jan. 26, 2006). The BIA held as follows: 
As discussed above, 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 does not purport to implement section 
212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act. Even if the regulation were applicable, however, we could not 
interpret it in a manner that would allow an alien to circumvent the statutory 10-year 
limitation on section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) waivers by simply reentering unlawfully before re-
questing the waiver. After all, it is the alien’s unlawful reentry without admission that 
makes section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) applicable in the first place. . . . We find that the more rea-
sonable interpretation of the statutory framework discussed above is that an alien may not 
obtain a waiver of the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility, retroactively or 
prospectively, without regard to the 10-year limitation set forth at section 
212(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
Id. 
 164. Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) bars aliens who are deported and illegally re-enter, like the plain-
tiffs in Duran Gonzales, from being admitted to the U.S. for ten years. 
 167. To complete the adjustment of status process, immigrants must pay: (1) a $1,000 penalty 
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grants to reapply for admission after having been deported. Forms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS., http://uscis.gov (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (follow “Forms” hyperlink). 
 168. See Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d at 1231. 
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favor, and instead deferred to the BIA’s decision in Torres-Garcia.169 
The Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Brand X and Chevron USA, stating that it would no longer follow the 
rule in Perez-Gonzalez and would instead defer to the BIA’s reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.170 Importantly, Duran Gonzales II overruled 
Perez-Gonzales not because it was an unlawful interpretation of § 245(i), 
but because the agency promulgated a contrary interpretation of an am-
biguous statute, which the court deferred to under Brand X and Chevron 
USA.171 Thus, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Torres-Garcia rule and re-
manded to the district court pursuant to that decision.172 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duran Gonzales II was the first de-
cision in the country to use Brand X to defer to an agency’s interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute that contradicted a circuit court’s prior interpre-
tation.173 The question remained whether the Ninth Circuit’s overruling 
of Perez-Gonzalez in Duran Gonzales II would be retroactively applied 
to the plaintiffs, who acted in reliance on the previous rule.174 No court 
had addressed a situation where an agency’s new rule conflicted with the 
circuit court’s precedent, individuals relied on the new rule, and the cir-
cuit court deferred to the agency decision pursuant to Brand X and Chev-
ron USA.175 On remand to the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the 
new rule announced in Duran Gonzales II should not apply retroactively, 
but the district court never addressed the retroactivity concerns and dis-
missed the plaintiff’s claims.176 The plaintiffs appealed the district 
court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit in Duran Gonzales III, stating that 
the district court erred in failing to conduct any retroactivity analysis.177 
The primary issue in Duran Gonzales III was whether the new rule, an-
                                                 
 169. Id. at 1236 (“Accordingly, Brand X requires us to review our prior opinion in Perez-
Gonzalez in light of the BIA’s subsequent decision in In re Torres-Garcia. If we conclude that Pe-
rez-Gonzalez was based, at least in part, on ambiguity in the applicable statutes, then pursuant to 
Chevron and Brand X we must give deference to the agency’s resolution of these ambiguities in In 
re Torres-Garcia.”) 
 170. Id. at 1241–42. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1242–43. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35174), 2009 WL 3459943. The plaintiffs stated, “[T]he retroactivity question 
now presented is whether the new rule should be applied to those class members who had already 
filed their applications before the new rule was announced, i.e., in reliance on the old rule under 
which they were eligible to have their waiver applications adjudicated.” Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. C06–1411–MJP, 2009 WL 302283 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2009). 
 177. Id. 
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nounced in Duran Gonzales II, should be retroactively applied to the 
plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs argued that the district court should have applied ei-
ther the Ninth Circuit’s Montgomery Ward test, the Landgraf test, or the 
Chevron Oil test.178 Conversely, the government relied on recent Su-
preme Court retroactivity cases, such as Harper and Beam, stating that 
there exists a presumption of retroactivity, which disallows the applica-
tion of Chevron Oil or any other retroactivity test.179 
While Duran Gonzales III was pending, another Ninth Circuit panel 
issued the decision Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity.180 Morales-Izquierdo applied the Duran Gonzales II rule retroactive-
ly to a different plaintiff.181 Similar to the plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales, 
the plaintiff in Morales-Izquierdo applied for an I-212 waiver before the 
BIA’s Torres-Garcia decision, and argued that the Duran Gonzales II 
rule should not apply retroactively.182 
The Morales-Izquierdo court refused to apply the Duran Gonzales 
rule prospectively because, even though § 245(i) of the LIFE Act was 
ambiguous, and the meanings the BIA and the Ninth Circuit ascribed to 
the LIFE Act were inherently inapposite, a statute can only have one 
meaning and, pursuant to Brand X and Chevron USA, the agency decides 
that meaning.183 It adopted the classical approach espoused by Justice 
Scalia, which provides that a prospective application would create two 
rules from the same single authority—an impermissible form of judicial 
activism in which the court would be legislating instead of adjudicat-
ing.184 Additionally, because Duran Gonzales II overruled Perez-
Gonzalez pursuant to agency deference, it is not a new rule of law that 
would make prospective application impermissible.185 In support of its 
conclusion, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper, stat-
ing that “new judicial decisions interpreting old statutes have long been 
applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, ‘regardless of 
                                                 
 178. See Plaintiff’s Reply Brief at 17, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174), 2009 
WL 3459945. 
 179. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174), 
2009 WL 3459944. 
 180. Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1086−88. 
 184. Id. at 1089. “‘[T]he Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating 
cases . . . that have not already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion 
that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.’” Id. (quoting 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)). 
 185. Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1090. 
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whether . . . events predate or postdate’ the statute-interpreting deci-
sion.”186 
Interestingly, shortly after the panel decision of Morales-Izquierdo, 
the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc decision, Nunez-Reyes, reviving the 
civil retroactivity test from Chevron Oil.187 Accordingly, the Duran Gon-
zales plaintiffs argued that because of the similar reliance interests pre-
sent in Nunez-Reyes, the court should not apply the Duran Gonzales II 
rule retroactively because the Chevron Oil test applies.188 Plaintiffs em-
phasized their reliance interests: they had paid a large sum of money for 
counsel, immigration fees, and fines, and much worse, they had been 
subjected to summary removal and separation from their lawful perma-
nent resident and U.S. citizen families because they had relied on a pre-
viously announced Ninth Circuit rule.189 
Conversely, the government argued that Morales-Izquierdo held 
that the rule announced in Duran Gonzales II applied retroactively to all 
cases open on direct review.190 It attempted to limit Nunez-Reyes, stating 
that Nunez-Reyes mandates a Chevron Oil test only when an alien waives 
his or her constitutional rights.191 Because no constitutional rights were 
at stake in Duran Gonzales, the reliance interests were not sufficient to 
warrant a prospective application.192 The next Part of this Comment will 
explore the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Duran Gonzales III, which 
downplays reliance interests, narrows Nunez-Reyes, and, ultimately, does 
very little to further genuine retroactivity jurisprudence. 
VI. DURAN GONZALES III 
After the BIA issued its conflicting Torres-Garcia decision, the 
Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA in Duran Gonzales II, then applied that 
rule retroactively in Morales-Izquierdo, and issued its en banc decision 
in Nunez-Reyes, which revived Chevron Oil in the immigration context. 
                                                 
 186. Id. (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). 
 187. See generally Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 188. See Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35174), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/lac/duran-gonzalez-supplemental-brief-2011-08-24.pdf. 
The en banc opinion in Nunez-Reyes makes clear that it was incumbent on the District 
Court to engage in a retroactivity analysis to determine whether the new rule announced 
in this case should be applied prospectively only. Specifically, Nunez-Reyes clarifies that 
the District Court should have applied the three factor test laid out in Chevron Oil Co. v. 
Huson. . . . 
Id. at 3. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
 190. Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1088. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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The Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the area of civil adjudicative 
retroactivity gave the Ninth Circuit the opportunity, in deciding Duran 
Gonzales III, to create a new guiding principle in this complex area of 
immigration law. With the facts in Duran Gonzales, the court could have 
extended Nunez-Reyes, mandated the application of Chevron Oil, and 
limited the fundamental unfairness that results when the BIA and circuit 
courts issue conflicting decisions. Instead, the Duran Gonzales III panel 
issued a narrow holding, denied prospective-only application, and did 
little to direct future retroactivity concerns.193 
After recounting the involved procedural history, the court dis-
cussed Morales-Izquierdo and Nunez-Reyes in turn.194 The court rea-
soned that Nunez-Reyes stood for a presumption of retroactive applica-
tion, and that if a new rule is to be applied only prospectively, this should 
be announced in the decision itself.195 Because Duran Gonzales II did not 
expressly limit its holding to prospective application, as the court did in 
Nunez-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit could not now limit the holding in this 
way.196 Therefore, Duran Gonzales II’s retroactive effect was automatic 
as soon as it was published without a prospective-only limitation.197 This, 
of course, is the opposite of legislative retroactivity, in which a new stat-
ute applies only prospectively unless the statute contains a clear mandate 
of retroactivity.198 
Regardless, the court held that Duran Gonzales II was not silent as 
to retroactivity because the final paragraph stated, “[P]laintiffs as a mat-
ter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible 
to receive I–212 waivers.”199 Essentially, the court relied on the rule from 
Harper, which states that a new judicial rule of law applies retroactively 
to the parties on direct review.200 By stating that the plaintiffs are ineligi-
ble, Duran Gonzales II automatically applied the rule retroactively to the 
plaintiffs. But there is a stark contrast between the plaintiffs in Harper, 
who were attempting to take advantage of a change in the law, and the 
plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales, who are being punished for it. 
Finally, the court determined that “our opinion in Morales–
Izquierdo, . . . held that Duran Gonzales II applies retroactively, and we 
are bound by that decision.”201 In sum, the Duran Gonzales III panel lim-
                                                 
 193. See generally Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 194. Id. at 933-39. 
 195. Id. at 938-39. 
 196. Id. at 939. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 244 (1994). 
 199. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 934. 
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ited its analysis to constraining external factors. It skirted the retroactivi-
ty issues recently revived in Nunez-Reyes and instead focused on circum-
spect stare decisis concerns, stating that “because we determine that we 
cannot retroactively revise Duran Gonzales II to have only prospective 
application, we need not determine whether we would limit Duran Gon-
zales II to prospective application if we could.”202 Because Morales-
Izquierdo expressly applied the new rule retroactively, and because Du-
ran Gonzales II applied its new rule to the plaintiffs, the court was bound 
by those decisions.203 In so holding, the Duran Gonzales III panel made 
several errors in its analysis. 
First, the court incorrectly concluded that it was bound by Morales-
Izquierdo instead of Nunez-Reyes. The subsequent en banc decision of 
Nunez-Reyes mandated the application of Chevron Oil when there is a 
new rule of law announced in a civil case that does not concern a court’s 
jurisdiction.204 Thus, Morales-Izquierdo conflicted with Nunez-Reyes in 
holding that when an agency rule is adopted pursuant to Brand X, it must 
be applied retroactively.205 Because the cases conflicted on this point and 
the reasoning in Morales-Izquierdo was superseded by Nunez-Reyes, Du-
ran Gonzales III was incorrect in relying on Morales-Izquierdo when 
that authority is irreconcilable with Nunez-Reyes.206 
Further, the court erred in stating that a decision to apply the new 
rule prospectively must be announced in the decision itself. The court 
reasoned that because Duran Gonzales II did not consider the application 
of the Chevron Oil factors, it precluded the possibility of doing so subse-
quently.207 But a host of lower courts have applied Chevron Oil after an 
appellate court reversed precedent without deciding the retroactivity is-
sue.208 Moreover, Nunez-Reyes never stated that a prospective-only rul-
ing must be announced at the time the new rule is announced. 
The bulk of the court’s reasoning for affirming Morales-Izquierdo 
and rejecting Nunez-Reyes and Chevron Oil is relies on the Supreme 
Court’s recent cases discussing civil-adjudicative retroactivity such as 
Harper, Beam, and Rivers v. Roadway Express. As noted in Part II, these 
cases use a “legal fiction” to preclude prospective-only application of 
                                                 
 202. Id. at 940. 
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adjudicatory rules. This “fiction” is that when there are two conflicting 
judicial constructions of a statute, the court will treat the subsequent in-
terpretation as if it was the original and only interpretation. Rather than 
treating the two conflicting rules as separate (and applying them as such), 
the court pretends that the first rule never existed. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that to do otherwise would create two rules when Congress has 
only promulgated one, turning the judiciary into legislative “activists” 
rather than passive interpreters. 
While this reasoning may be effective in traditional civil adjudica-
tory cases, it does not take into account Brand X, where the agency’s in-
terpretation prevails, and the unique concerns of immigration law, where 
reliance interests result in severe consequences. Brand X holds that the 
agency is the “authoritative interpreter . . . of such statutes,” and this ex-
treme deference generates conflicting rules of law between the agency 
(BIA) and circuit courts.209 Aliens that put faith in the prior circuit court 
rules can be deported because they relied in good faith on a binding, pub-
lished rule of law that was then changed pursuant to Brand X. Thus, this 
“legal fiction” of treating the conflicting rules equally, which was only 
recently espoused by the Supreme Court, is especially pernicious because 
it causes fundamental inequities and has disastrous consequences for 
immigrants. 
Finally, and most importantly, the court erred in limiting the appli-
cation of Nunez-Reyes. Nunez-Reyes recognized the inequity of retroac-
tivity in cases applying Brand X, and decided that the Chevron Oil test 
was necessary to alleviate that unfairness. But the Duran Gonzales III 
court chose to narrow the Nunez-Reyes decision by stating that the reli-
ance issues there were more significant because they rose to the level of 
waiving one’s constitutional right: 
[T]he situation in Nunez–Reyes is distinct from that presented in this 
appeal. In Nunez–Reyes, the petitioner and others similarly situated 
waived constitutional rights in reliance on our prior opinion. . . . 
Here, the Plaintiffs, in relying on Perez–Gonzalez, did not waive 
any constitutional right, although they did disclose to the govern-
ment their illegal presence within the country. Whatever weight 
might be given to such reliance, it is considerably less than that giv-
en to the waiver of a constitutional right.210 
Yet, Nunez-Reyes never limited its holding to cases in which consti-
tutional rights were at stake. As discussed in Part IV, the fact that the 
respondents in that case would be waiving their right to a jury trial was 
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neither a threshold requirement for whether the Chevron Oil test applied, 
nor a necessary reliance interest. The constitutional right, the waiver of a 
jury trial, was discussed only after the court decided that the test should 
apply. And even though the respondents would have waived a constitu-
tional right in reliance on the prior rule, making their case stronger, it 
was never a requirement that constitutional rights be at stake. The threat 
of removal may be an even more convincing reliance interest. Moreover, 
the application of Chevron Oil has never required a constitutional right. 
Indeed, Chevron Oil was not a constitutional challenge, but a question of 
statutory interpretation.211 
Therefore, the Duran Gonzales III court erred in not binding itself 
to the holding in Nunez-Reyes. Had it done so, the court would have con-
cluded that because Duran Gonzales involved a civil case in which the 
court announced a new rule of law that did not concern its jurisdiction, 
the Chevron Oil test applied. Given the strength of the reliance interests 
in that case, it is unlikely that the court would then have applied Duran 
Gonzales II retroactively to the plaintiffs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Duran Gonzales III’s reasoning is flawed in several respects, and 
more importantly, it is a step backward from addressing the important 
issues that Nunez-Reyes attempted to alleviate. The Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sions in Nunez-Reyes and Duran Gonzales III reflect the same conflicting 
principles in the Supreme Court’s adjudicative retroactivity jurispru-
dence. Nunez-Reyes is a return to Chevron Oil’s reliance-based princi-
ples, while Duran Gonzales III affirms the reasoning in Morales-
Izquierdo that “when a court interprets a statute, even an ambiguous one, 
and even when that interpretation conflicts with the court’s own prior 
interpretation, the new interpretation is treated as the statute’s one-and-
only meaning.”212 Where Nunez-Reyes elevated reliance principles, Du-
ran Gonzales III distinguished and narrowed them. Given the Supreme 
Court’s incoherent jurisprudence on the subject, it is not surprising that 
the Ninth Circuit is struggling to produce a clear consensus. This Com-
ment argues that it should favor the principles of reliance to create a clear 
driving principle in the immigration context. 
This argument is furthered by the administrative law principles dis-
cussed in Chevron USA and Brand X. Under Brand X, the court in Duran 
Gonzales II was obligated to adopt the agency’s new rule. When courts 
are required to reverse precedent based on a conflicting agency rule, 
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principles of fundamental fairness inherent in this country’s Constitution, 
weigh against applying that rule retroactively.213 Brand X’s effects can-
not be overstated. That decision will continue to create the same issues 
present in Duran Gonzales. 214 The Ninth Circuit, the circuit that handles 
the most immigration appeals in the country, should generate a guiding 
principle that reflects the inequity of retroactivity in immigration law. It 
began with Nunez-Reyes and the application of Chevron Oil, and it 
should rehear Duran Gonzales III, en banc, and extend the Nunez-Reyes 
holding in that case. 
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